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REGULATING ROBOCALLS AND MODERN DEBT
COLLECTION PRACTICES—EXAMINING GOVERNMENTAL
RESPONSES AND THEIR FIRST AMENDMENT
IMPLICATIONS
INTRODUCTION
When people pick up their phones to answer a call, most individuals hope to
speak with someone who is relaying an important message. With the recent
influx of robocalls repeatedly dialing phone numbers, more people are becoming
increasingly hesitant to accept a call when an unrecognizable string of numbers
flashes across their phone screen. In a February 2019 report from the Federal
Communications Commission, the agency reported that YouMail, a private
company that collects information on call volume throughout the United States,
estimated that upwards of 48 billion robocalls were placed in 2018, with 26.3
billion of those calls being made to mobile phones. 1
In an effort to combat the growing influx of deceptive calls and mitigate the
daily annoyance that these calls bring to consumers, the United States Congress,
the Federal Communications Commission, and the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau have sought to strengthen the regulations and penalties for
telemarketers placing these calls and bolster the protections for consumers to
prevent receiving these incessant calls. 2 The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(FDCPA) was passed to eliminate abusive debt collection practices and applies
to personal and household transactions. 3 As federal agencies have increased
their robocall and telemarketing regulations in efforts to protect American
consumers from scams and deceptive call practices, debt collectors are
increasingly being perceived as scammers. The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) has recently begun to respond to this issue by conducting
1
U.S. FED. COMM. COMMISSION, CONSUMER AND GOVERNMENTAL AFF. BUREAU, CG DOCKET NO. 1759, REPORT OF ROBOCALLS (2019).
2
The FCC’s Push to Combat Robocalls, FED. COMM. COMMISSION (last visited Nov. 26, 2019),
https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/fcc-initiatives/fccs-push-combat-robocalls-spoofing.

In June of 2019, the Federal Communications Commission ruled that phone companies and
individual consumers can opt-in to call blocking tools that stop robocalls from reaching
consumers’ phones. The FCC has also levied large fines against telemarketing companies who
have engaged in spoofing, which is a technique used by telemarketing companies that tricks
consumers into thinking that they are getting a call from a local number, making them more likely
to pick up the phone.
Id.
3
KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION
§1.01 (2019), LEXISNEXIS.
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proposed rulemaking in order to better clarify permitted debt collection
practices. 4 Congress has also tried to respond to this issue by passing broader
robocall statutes, such as the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) and
the Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act
(TRACED Act), which both delegate authority to agencies to implement
measures that better protect American consumers. Yet, regulating debt
collectors’ communications also raises First Amendment concerns. These
Congressional statutes that provide agencies and private entities with the
authority to limit and block communications from debt collectors and
robocallers could too greatly infringe one’s constitutionally protected First
Amendment rights.
The gap between permissible debt collection practices and ineffective
federal robocall regulations demonstrates a shortcoming in policy-making where
more specificity from the federal government is required to help dictate
appropriate and effective parameters for legal debt collection practices. In order
to properly protect debt collectors and debtors, federal agencies should amend
their regulations to provide clearer and more useful rules for debt collectors
when they try to recover their debts, while also ensuring that debt collectors are
not effectively barred from trying to make good faith contact with the debtor.
Additionally, in order to prevent the unconstitutional stifling of speech by debt
collectors, Congress should amend its laws to more directly achieve its stated
goals without being too over or under-inclusive of barring speech.
This Comment will provide background information on the steps that
Congress and federal agencies have taken to try to solve the issues surrounding
robocalls and fair debt collection practices, specifically examining the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), the Federal Communication Commission’s
declaratory rulings on call blocking, the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau’s notice of proposed rulemaking, the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act (TCPA), and the Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and
Deterrence Act (TRACED Act). This Comment will examine the provisions and
shortcomings of these statutes and regulations. Two notable shortcomings
include the FCC employing over-broad standards to detect fraudulent calls and
pre-emptively blocking those calls from reaching consumers, as well as the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act allowing consumers to cease all communications
with debt collectors.

4
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Proposes Regulations to Implement the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (May 7, 2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
about-us/newsroom/bureau-proposes-regulations-implement-fair-debt-collection-practices-act/.
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This Comment will then examine the growing First Amendment concerns
surrounding these provisions and apply a First Amendment analysis to the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act and the Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal
Enforcement and Deterrence Act. Under a First Amendment analysis, the
FDCPA could fail under a content-based strict scrutiny standard of review and
under a commercial speech intermediate scrutiny standard of review, while the
TRACED Act may be able to survive an intermediate scrutiny standard of
review. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act will be the first provision
analyzed below.
I.

FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

A. The Creation of CFPB
Congress enacted the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) in 1977
with the goal of preventing debt collectors from utilizing abusive debt collection
practices against consumers. 5 In 2010 under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
Act, the CFPB was created and granted concurrent authority with the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) to oversee debt collection practices and enforce the
goals and provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. 6 More recently in May of 2019, the
CFPB decided to take action by issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking that
seeks to provide consumers with stronger protections against debt collectors. 7
The notice of proposed rulemaking highlighted the CFPB’s intention to place
limits on the number of calls that can be placed to debtors each week, to outline
how debt collectors can utilize new technology to reach consumers, and its plan
to require debt collectors to provide more information to consumers on how to
respond to calls for the collection of their debts. 8 The notice of proposed
rulemaking specifically addresses new communications technology, such as text
messaging, emails, and voicemails, that were unaddressed by the initial passing
of the FDCPA. 9 These regulations seek to modernize the FDCPA to address
modern needs unique from the debt collection practices at the time of the law’s
passage.
The passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 allowed the FDCPA to be
adapted to issues concerning consumers and debtors in a modern economy. Prior
5

Mattson, supra.
Id.
7
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Proposes Regulations to Implement the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, supra.
8
Mattson, supra.
9
Id.
6
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to 2010, the FTC retained a majority of the enforcement role for the FDCPA.
The FTC could work in conjunction with other federal agencies whose work
related to a party identified to be the subject of an FDCPA enforcement action. 10
The FTC was permitted under the FDCPA to issue advisory opinions on the
proper application of the statute, but the agency lacked power delegated from
Congress to create new rules and regulations to meet the growing challenges of
a constantly modernizing consumer landscape. 11 The Dodd-Frank Act created
the CFPB and delegated authority to the Bureau to create new rules for debt
collection practices. 12 The purpose of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
is to protect consumers from “unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and take action
against companies that break the law.” 13 The agency’s supervisory authority is
wide-ranging and includes financial institutions, depository institutions with
assets over $10 billion, mortgage-related businesses, pay day lenders, student
lenders, and financial companies—including debt collectors. 14
B. Who the FDCPA Applies To
The FDCPA applies directly to the conduct of debt collectors, 15 which
includes any act that is taken “in connection with the collection of any debt.” 16
In order to qualify as a debt collector, the primary purpose of the actor must be
to collect debts. 17 Debt collection agencies are encompassed in the definition of
debt collection since their primary business is based on the collection of debts.
Under the FDCPA, an individual attempting to collect a debt from a consumer
on behalf of the creditor is not necessarily a debt collector. 18 People who collect
consumer debt that is not at default at the time of purchasing the debt are not
held as debt collectors, but those who purchase debts, such as debts that are part

10
Id. Other regulatory agencies would sometimes include the Federal Reserve Board, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of Thrift Supervision, National
Credit Union Administration, the Secretary of Transportation, and the Secretary of Agriculture. Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
The Bureau, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (last visited Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.
consumerfinance.gov/about-us/the-bureau/.
14
KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION
§1.01 (2019), LEXISNEXIS.
15
Mattson, supra §1.03.
16
Id.
17
Id. An entity that collects debts while in the course of conducting other business does not qualify as a
debt collector under the FDCPA. Id.
18
KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION
§1.01 (2019), LEXISNEXIS. An example of this situation is where a car dealership makes collection calls for its
finance company. Id.
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of loan portfolios, that are in default at the time purchase are held to be debt
collectors for the purposes of the Act. 19
Case law has demonstrated a willingness by the courts to treat individuals as
debt collectors under the FDCPA when through their communications with
debtors, the caller requesting payment acts as if a debt is in default even if the
debt has already been repaid. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Bridge v.
Ocwen Federal Bank 20 held that a debt collector includes “any non-originating
debt holder that either acquired the debt in default or has treated the debt as if it
were in default at time of acquisition.” 21 Through this ruling, the Sixth Circuit
placed these debt collectors under the authority and limitations of the FDCPA
for merely treating a perceived debt as if it was in default, thus opening debt
collectors up to penalty for their mistakes or lack of updated information on the
status of a debt. 22 Harvesters of phone numbers can also be deemed debt
collectors. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Romine v. Diversified
Collection Services, Inc. 23 held that when the Automated Voice Telegram
System service obtained debtors’ phone numbers and subsequently provided
those numbers to creditors and collection agencies, that third party’s conduct
would be enough to deem the company a debt collector. 24 The court relied on
the legislative history of the FDCPA and argued that the purpose of the statute
is to “limit harassing, misleading, and fraudulent contacts and communications
with or about consumer debtors. . . . Most of the ‘collection abuses’ outlined in

19

Mattson, supra §1.03.
Id. (see Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 681 F.3d 355, 355–64 (6th Cir. 2012)). In Bridge, Lisa Bridge
signed a mortgage and note for a home. William Bridge did not sign the note but signed the mortgage. There
was confusion as to whether Lisa made her April 2002 mortgage loan payment due to a question of availability
of funds. Lisa asserts that she made two mortgage payments in April 2002, even though only one payment was
recorded. Lisa and William filed a complaint that asserted that Ocwen placed multiple phone calls to engage in
debt collection for the alleged debt owed by Lisa Bridge and that these debt collection calls violated the FDCPA.
In her third amended complaint, the Northern District of Ohio held that Lisa Bridge lost in her claim of violation
of the FDCPA, because she failed to allege that Ocwen’s debt collection practices were “false and misleading,
unfair, harassing, abusive, or otherwise violated the FDCPA.” Bridge v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, No. 1:07 CV 2739,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74192, at *26 (N.D. Ohio May 30, 2014).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Mattson, supra §1.03 (citing Romine v. Diversified Collection Servs., 155 F.3d 1142, 1143–49 (9th Cir.
1998)). In Romine, Diversified Collection Services (DCS), a debt collection agency, hired Western Union for its
Automated Voice Telegram (AVT) service. The AVT service sends notices to debtors to call the AVT service.
Once the call is placed, Western Union collects the debtor’s phone number and personal information and sends
that information to DCS. Here, the petitioner called Western Union after getting a notification and was not told
that the purpose of the call was to collect a debt that they allegedly owed. AVT then sent DCS the debtor’s
information. DCS used the petitioner’s newly acquired phone number to contact the debtor on multiple
occasions. Romine, 155 F.3d at 1143–49.
24
Id. (citing Romine v. Diversified Collection Servs., 155 F.3d 1142, 1143–49 (9th Cir. 1998)).
20
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the legislative history involve improper contacts with consumer debtors.” 25 If
Congress intended to limit the term debt collector to just include registered debt
collection agencies and exclude non-registered third parties whose work
includes collecting debts, it would have specified the limitation. 26 Because of
both Western Union’s advertised service to catalyze debt collection through its
urgent contacts with debtors, as well as its conduct through the collection of
phone numbers and personal information of debtors, Western Union was liable
as a debt collector under the FDCPA. 27
C. Restrictions Placed on Debt Collectors under the FDCPA
Along with its defining debt collection in a way that protects consumers, the
FDCPA attempts to impose restrictions on how a debt collector may contact a
debtor. 28 In general, a debt collector cannot engage in conduct that would
“harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with collection of debt.” 29
The debt collector also may not try to make contact with a debtor at inconvenient
and impermissible times and places, as well as through unauthorized persons.
1. Unusual Times and Places
Debt collectors are not permitted to communicate with consumers during
unusual times or places, or at any time or place that the collectors know would
be an inconvenience for that debtor. 30 The debt collector is required to operate
on the assumption that a convenient time to communicate with the consumer is
between 8:00 a.m. and 9 p.m. 31 A violation occurs if the consumer indicates to
the collector that they work a night shift and the collector proceeds to call during
early morning hours when the individual is likely to be asleep. 32 Absent consent,
communications taking place at the consumer’s place of employment are also
prohibited if the debt collector is aware that the employer prohibits the employee
from receiving those types of communications in the workplace. 33

25

Romine, 155 F.3d at 1149.
Id. at 1146.
27
Id. at 1149.
28
KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS.
26

HARRISONFINAL_5.7.20 (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

REGULATING ROBOCALLS

5/8/2020 9:36 AM

73

2. Locating and Communicating with Individuals
If the collector is attempting to locate the debtor, they may not tell the state
where the debtor lives that the individual owes a debt. 34 The collector also may
not communicate with a person more than once to track down the location of the
debtor unless the first response was erroneous. 35 In terms of communicating with
an individual, debt collectors may not use language on a mailed envelope or in
its contents indicating that the debt collector is seeking to collect a debt from the
recipient or that the communication relates to such topic, or communicate with
anyone other than a debtor’s attorney if the debtor retains counsel for the
matter. 36 A debt collector is also prohibited from communicating about the debts
with anyone other than the consumer, their retained attorney, a consumerreporting agency, the creditor, and the creditor’s attorney. 37
D. Restrictions under Section 1692(d)
Under §1692(d) of the FDCPA, a debt collector may not engage in conduct
to recover debts whose consequences include harassing, oppressing, or abusing
any person related to the debt. 38 The following list provides six categories of
activities that are prohibited under this section.
1. Violence & Other Criminal Means
First, a debt collector cannot threaten or use violence or any other criminal
means to harm a person’s property, reputation, or person. This includes
protection for third parties in the debtor’s life, such as their employer,
coworkers, friends, and family. 39
2. Obscene or Profane Language
Second, the debt collector is not permitted to use obscene or profane
language or language that would offend the hearer. 40 Obscenity is defined as,
“(1) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (2)

34

Id.
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS.
39
Id.
40
Id.
35
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whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (3) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.” 41 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals defined profane as “denoting
certain of those personally reviling epithets naturally tending to provoke violent
resentment or denoting language which under contemporary community
standards is so grossly offensive to members of the public who actually hear it
as to amount to a nuisance.” 42 Oftentimes, this is a fact specific inquiry for the
court. Sexual innuendos, racial slurs, name-calling, stereotyping, and
overzealous insults tend to be recognized by the court as being obscene and
profane language. 43 Additionally, the profane or obscene message does not have
to be directly relayed to the debtor. The debtor does not have to read or hear the
original language in order for the natural consequence of the language to qualify
as harassing, oppressing, or abusing the individual. 44
3. Published Lists
The third category of impermissible conduct states that debt collectors may
not publish lists of consumers who have failed to pay their debts. 45
4. Advertising Sale of Debt
Fourth, a debt collector is not permitted to advertise a debt for sale in order
to elicit payment of the debt from the debtor. 46 Advertising the sale of a debt
could be viewed as a method to pressure the debtor to pay back their debts. 47
However, a debt collector is permitted to place advertisements for the sale of the
debt as long as the advertisement’s purpose is not to elicit payment from the
debtor. 48

41

Id.
Id. (quoting Tallman v. United States, 465 F.2d 282, 286 (7th Cir. 1972)).
43
KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS.
44
Id. An example is where a debt collector leaves a message for the individual that is harassing in nature.
The consumer did not have to hear or read this message contemporaneously for it to qualify as being harassing
in nature. Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. Debts can be sold by debt collectors on a secondary market. Id. The purchasers of debt will try to
recover the outstanding debts and are paid once the debts are re-paid. Amy Fontinelle, How the Debt Collection
Agency Business Works, INVESTOPEDIA (Jul. 6, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/
121514/how-debt-collection-agency-business-works.asp.
47
KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS.
48
Id.
42
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5. Telephone Harassment
Fifth, telephone harassment is prohibited. The collector may not cause the
phone to ring repeatedly and continuously with the intent to “annoy, abuse, or
harass” the person who is called. 49 The creditor also may not engage in repeated
phone conversations to harass the individual. 50 Because the Act specifically
prohibits repeated telephone calls, the debt collector needs to consider the
number of times that they are placing their calls. If the debtor terminates a call,
the debt collector calling the debtor back contemporaneously with the end of the
prior call would most likely count as harassment. 51
6. Caller Identity
Sixth, debt collectors may not place these calls without disclosure of the
caller’s identity. 52 The FDCPA does not prohibit individuals from telling the
debtor a trade name or alias. This is permitted because there is still a meaningful
disclosure of the caller’s identity, regardless of whether the individual placing
the call reveals their full name. 53
E. Affirmative Protections for Debtors
The FDCPA includes proactive protections for the debtor, such as permitting
the debtor to notify the debt collector that they either refuse to pay the debt or
express their wish for the debt collector to stop further communication. 54 If
either of these wishes are demonstrated by the debtor, the debt collector must
respect the consumer’s wishes and communication must come to a complete
stop. 55 This bar to communication excludes the debt collector stating that their
debt collection efforts are being terminated, notifying the debtor that the debt
collector will remedy the debt by enforcing payment in court, and notifying the
consumer that the debtor intends to invoke a special remedy not ordinarily
utilized. 56 A lawyer could constitute a debt collector under FDCPA for their
communications with the debtor. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Romine
highlighted that a lawyer who is engaged in litigation to cover debts owed to the
49

Id.
Id.
51
Id.
52
KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
50
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creditor could constitute debt collection. 57 The Supreme Court in Heintz v.
Jenkins stated that “Litigation . . . seems simply one way of collecting debt.” 58
The question remains whether a consumer could stop a lawsuit by barring
further communications between themselves and the debt collector. The
Supreme Court in Heintz 59 held that while it would be strange for the Act to
permit the consumer to stop communications relating to a lawsuit and cause the
litigation to cease, the statute already prevents this scenario by allowing the debt
collector to argue that they are notifying the debtor that they are invoking a
special remedy, which could mean that the creditor is going to enforce payment
of the debt in court. 60 To prevent additional liability as a debt collector, attorneys
for the debt collector who are notified of the debtor’s wishes to end
communications should avoid communications with the debtor that are not
specifically related to the procedure of the unfolding litigation. 61
Even though the debtor can cut off communication with the debt collector,
this protection may be waived. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Clark v.
Capital Credit & Collection Services held that when a consumer communicates
their wishes to terminate contact but subsequently contacts the debt collector,
the consumer effectively waived their right to cease contact. 62 In applying this
ruling, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Shuler v. Ingram & Associates
held that a collector’s five phone calls to debtor, which included one successful
contact and two voicemails after the debtor’s request to cut off communication,
did not amount to harassment since the calls were made after the debtor
contacted the collector to engage in further discussions regarding their debt. The
debtor’s communication was effectively a waiver of the right to terminate
communications. 63
As seen above, the FDCPA places restrictions on the methods by which a
debt collector can contact a debtor to collect outstanding debts. In efforts to
57

Romine v. Diversified Collection Servs., 155 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id. (quoting Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 297–98 (1995)).
59
KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS (citing Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292–99 (1995)). In Heintz, Jenkins borrowed
money from a bank to purchase a car. The bank’s lawyer, Heintz, filed a lawsuit in state court in order to recover
the balance of the debt. The bank’s attorney sent a letter to Jenkins’s attorney, which listed the amount owed
and the cost of the insurance purchased by the bank as a result of the debtor’s failure to insure the vehicle. Jenkins
argued that Heintz and his law firm violated the FDCPA, because they sought to recover money that was not
included in the original loan agreement. Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id. (citing Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., 460 F.3d 1162, 1166–79 (9th Cir. 2006).
63
Id. (citing Shuler v. Ingram & Assocs., 441 F. App’x 712, 714–21 (11th Cir. 2011)).
58
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better clarify the FDCPA, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s notice of
proposed rulemaking seeks to be able to provide more guidance to debt
collectors on appropriate methods of communication, specifically addressing
phone calls and limited content messages. 64
II. CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU’S NOTICE OF
PROPOSED RULEMAKING
A. Limits on Phone Calls and Limited Content Messages
In its notice of proposed rule making, the CFPB asserts that the agency’s
new regulations will seek to promulgate clearer standards for debt collectors
when communicating with consumers through modern forms of communication,
including emails, text messages, and voice mails. 65 Because these methods of
communication are more sophisticated than simply placing phone calls,
consumers have greater control in deciding how and when they interact with
others. While these methods together provide a wider array of possibilities for
contact with the consumer, they also provide easier ways to avoid
communication. Consumers can choose to ignore emails, can more readily
examine the identity of the person or company trying to make contact with them,
and could decline contact altogether. Individuals using social media platforms
can selectively choose their security settings to block contact and
communication with unknown third parties, as well as restrict their ability to be
identified by other users. 66
The CFPB plans to use the term, limited-content message, to identify the
amount of information that a debt collector is allowed to include in messages
sent to consumers without invoking the requirements of being a communication
under the FDCPA. 67 This is significant since the proposed rule seeks to impose
stricter requirements on the number of communications that debt collectors are
permitted to make to consumers. Examples of limited-content messages include
leaving voicemails or sending text messages to consumers’ phones. 68 Because
the proposed rule would allow leaving a limited content message, debt collectors

64
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Proposes Regulations to Implement the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (May 7, 2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
about-us/newsroom/bureau-proposes-regulations-implement-fair-debt-collection-practices-act/.
65
Id.
66
Debt Collection Practices Act (Regulation F), 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006 (2019), https://files.consumerfinance.
gov/f/documents/cfpb_debt-collection-NPRM.pdf.
67
Id. at 6.
68
Id. at 7.
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could be discouraged from engaging in continuous phone calls in efforts to
convey their message to consumers.
The notice of proposed rulemaking places limits on the number of calls, or
communications, that can be placed to debtors. Debt collectors would be
permitted to make no more than seven attempted calls per debt within one
week. 69 This provision has drawn criticism by consumer watchdog groups who
are concerned that seven calls per week per debt can quickly become excessive,
especially when individuals have multiple debts and have not formally optedout of receiving text messages, e-mails, or voice-mails. 70
As will be seen below, the CFPB’s notice of proposed rulemaking to limit
the number of calls attempted by debt collectors to seven attempts per week 71
follows in step with the FCC’s opt-in call blocking system and the FTC’s Do
Not Call Registry. These collective efforts to greatly limit the number of calls
getting through to consumers act as a major barrier for debt collectors and
robocallers alike.
III. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION REGULATIONS
A. FCC Regulations and Efforts to Block Calls
On June 6, 2019, the Federal Communications Commission issued a
declaratory ruling and notice of proposed rulemaking that allows phone
companies to proactively block what they deem to be unwanted calls from
reaching consumers. 72 The decision by phone companies whether to block calls
from incoming phone numbers shall be based on “reasonable call analytics.” 73
Reasonable call analytics could include factors such as, “large bursts of calls in
a short timeframe; low average call duration; low call completion ratios . . . a
large volume of complaints related to a suspect line; [and] sequential dialing
69
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Proposes Regulations to Implement the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (May 7, 2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
about-us/newsroom/bureau-proposes-regulations-implement-fair-debt-collection-practices-act/.
70
Consumer Watchdog’s Proposed Debt Collection Rule Bits Consumers: Authorizes Harassment by
Debt Collectors, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER (May 7, 2019), https://www.nclc.org/mediacenter/consumer-watchdogs-proposed-debt-collection-rule-bites-consumers-authorizes-harassment-by-debtcollectors.html.
71
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Proposes Regulations to Implement the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, supra.
72
FCC AFFIRMS ROBOCALL BLOCKING BY DEFAULT TO HELP PROTECT CONSUMERS, Federal Comm.
Commission (June 6, 2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-357852A1.pdf.
73
Id.
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patterns.” 74 Companies are allowed to make these proactive call-blocking
decisions on behalf of consumers as long as customers are aware of the callblocking program and know that they have the option to opt-out. 75 Phone
providers may also allow customers to opt-in to call blocking tools that would
block phone calls from numbers that are not listed in a consumer’s contact list
from ever reaching their phone. 76 In effect, this opt-in program permits
consumers to designate who they are willing to receive calls from specifically
according to the phone numbers that are identified on their contact list.
The FCC in their declaratory ruling states that it believes the benefit to
consumers from offering opt-out call blocking services will exceed the costs
incurred by telemarketers and businesses that try to establish communication
with consumers but ultimately fail as a result. 77 The ruling cites that YouMail, a
private company that collects information on call volume throughout the United
States, reported that half of the top twenty spam callers were categorized as debt
collection callers. 78 In addition to this finding, the Federal Trade Commission
compiled reports of complaints filed by consumers and organized those
complaints by category of communication. In the last fully published report
issued in 2016, debt collection calls were the highest reported calls complained
of by consumers. 79 Of the over 3 million complaints, debt collection calls were
the highest reported complaint reaching 28% of the overall complaints filed. 80
B. FTC Regulations and the Do Not Call Registry
In 2003, the Federal Trade Commission started the National Do Not Call
Registry, which provides a method for Americans to block calls from specific
phone numbers. 81 This service mainly serves individuals who are trying to block
calls from telemarketers and salespersons. Once a phone number is added to the
registry, the consumer’s phone number must be removed from the company’s
74
Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, Call Authentication Trust Anchor,
47 C.F.R. §64 at 13 (2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-51A1.pdf.
75
Id. at 12.
76
Id. at 15.
77
Id. at 14.
78
Id. at 4.
79
FTC CONSUMER SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK at 78 (2016) https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-book-january-december-2016/csn_cy-2016_data_book.
pdf. The report defined debt collection calls as “repeatedly or continuously, falsely represents the amount or
status of debt, fails to send written notice of debt, falsely threatens suits, uses profane language, fails to identify
self as debt collections and/or violates other provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.” Id.
80
Id. at 3.
81
The Do Not Call Registry, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (last visited Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/
news-events/media-resources/do-not-call-registry.
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call list within 31-day cycles. 82 In the FTC’s Fiscal Year 2018 report, the most
common complaint filed with the registry pertained to calls relating to
“Reducing Debt” or debt collectors. 83 In 2018, 729,366 complaints were filed
against debt collectors. 641,734 complaints were for debt collectors who
contacted consumers via robocall. 87,632 of the complaints were filed against
live callers. 84
The FDCPA and the CFPB’s notice of proposed rulemaking seek to establish
clear standards for debt collectors to follow when placing debt collection calls. 85
The FCC’s 2019 declaratory ruling broadens the scope of regulation to permit
phone companies to implement call-blocking technologies for phone numbers
that are suspected to be fraudulent, 86 and the FTC’s Do Not Call Registry gives
power to consumers to proactively halt repeated telemarketing calls. 87 Congress
itself through the TCPA and the TRACED Act sought to provide clearer and
stricter restrictions on placing robocalls without solely singling out debt
collection calls. The overarching goals of both statutes, which will be analyzed
below, are to ensure consumer privacy and protection from fraudulent and illegal
robocalls.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO TELEMARKETING AND DEBT COLLECTION:
THE TCPA AND THE TRACED ACT
A. The Creation of the TCPA
In an attempt to combat growing issues relating to telemarketers, Congress
passed the Telephone Consumer Protection Act in 1991. 88 The TCPA restricts
telemarketing calls made by automated dialing systems and pre-recorded voices

82
Do Not Call Registry Data Book 2018: About the National Do Not Call Registry, FED. TRADE
COMMISSION (last visited Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/commission-staffreports/national-do-not-call-registry-data-book-fy-6.
83
Do Not Call Registry Data Book 2018: Complaint Figures for FY 2018, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (last
visited Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/policy/reports/policy-reports/commission-staff-reports/national-donot-call-registry-data-book-fy-6.
84
Id.
85
See KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND
REGULATION §1.01 (2019), LEXISNEXIS.; See Debt Collection Practices Act (Regulation F), 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006
(2019), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_debt-collection-NPRM.pdf.
86
Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, Call Authentication Trust Anchor,
47 C.F.R. §64 (2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-51A1.pdf.
87
The Do Not Call Registry, supra.
88
FCC Actions on Robocalls, Telemarketing, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/general/telemarketing-androbocalls (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
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from reaching consumers. 89 The 1991 law makes it unlawful for any person 90 to
place a call using automatic dialing or artificial prerecorded voices without the
prior express consent of the consumer. 91 A telemarketing call is defined as “the
initiation of a telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the
purchase or rental of, or investment in, property, goods, or services, which is
transmitted to any person.” 92
B. Consent Requirements and Exemptions
The FCC’s 2013 enforcement rule implementing the TCPA required
companies to obtain written consent before placing auto-dialed and pre-recorded
calls to consumers. The 2013 rule also removed an exception that allowed
businesses with an established business relationship with the consumer to place
prerecorded telemarketing calls to consumers’ residential landlines. 93
Regardless of whether there was an existing business relationship, the 2013 rule
required the business to obtain written consent before a pre-recorded call could
be placed to the residential landline. 94 The rule also mandated that when the
automated call is made, businesses are required to provide consumers with an
automated opt-out feature, allowing them to immediately block the telemarketer
from calling them. 95 Congress later changed the written consent requirement in
the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 to exempt robocalls that were “made solely
to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States” from the consent
requirements. 96
The FCC justified this rollback of the consent requirements for debt
collection services by highlighting that if debt collectors cannot contact
consumers, debtors are at a greater threat of accumulating larger quantities of

89

Id.
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, FCC 16-72
(2016) (Declaratory Ruling), https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2016/db0706/FCC-1672A1.pdf. The TCPA defines “person” as an individual, partnership, association, joint-stock company, trust, or
corporation. Id. at 2.
91
Michael P. Daly et al., New Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA) Rules Take Effect on
October 16, 2013, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/newtelephone-consumer-protection-act-1991-tcpa-rules-take-effect-october-16-2013.
92
47 U.S.C.S. § 227(a)(4) (2019).
93
Daly et al., supra.
94
Id.
95
FCC Actions on Robocalls, Telemarketing, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/general/telemarketing-androbocalls (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
96
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, §301, 129 Stat. 584 (2015) (amending
47 U.S.C. § 227(b)).
90
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debt. 97 These debt collection calls for debts owed to the United States
government were limited to three calls within a 30-day period. 98 The Bipartisan
Budget Act of 2015 made this exemption before the FCC had the opportunity to
address whether government contractors were subject to the TCPA. The
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 pre-empted agency rulemaking by ensuring that
debt collection calls placed by government contractors were exempt from TCPA
consent requirements, regardless of future agency rulemaking that would
attempt to regulate government contractors under the purview of the TCPA. 99
In a 2016 declaratory ruling issued by the FCC, the agency clarified the
TCPA rules applying to prerecorded phone calls and text messages placed by
the government and directed to consumers. 100 In one of three petitions filed,
Broadnet Teleservices LLC asked the FCC to order that federal, state, and local
governments are not labeled as “persons” for the purposes of the TCPA. 101 If the
government qualifies as a person under the TCPA, then it cannot place prerecorded or autodialed calls without following the statute’s consent
requirements. The Commission agreed with Broadnet and reasoned that if
Congress intended to define the government as a “person” under the TCPA, the
statute would have included the government in its definition. Including the
government in the TCPA’s definition of a person would place the government
under TCPA restrictions and would significantly inhibit the government’s ability
to make contact with citizens. 102
In addition to government exemptions, the FCC ordered that the term
“person” does not include a contractor who is working on behalf of the federal
government. 103 In order to claim the same exemption as the government under
the TCPA, the contractor must be authorized to act as a government agent, act
within the scope of its contractual relationship with the government, and the

97
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, FCC 16-99, 1,
2 (2016) (Report and Order).
98
Id. The idea behind the exemption is that if consumers cannot be contacted and informed of their debts,
then consumers will continue to be uninformed about what they owe, leading to greater financial burden. Id.
99
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, FCC 16-72, 1,
12 n.96 (2016) (Declaratory Ruling), https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2016/db0706/
FCC-16-72A1.pdf.
100
Id. at 6–11.
101
Id. at 8.
102
Id. at 8. Types of communication that could be inhibited would include telephone calls to collect data
for policy determinations, conducting phone surveys, and disseminating information regarding government
assistance programs. Id.
103
Id. at 9.

HARRISONFINAL_5.7.20 (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

REGULATING ROBOCALLS

5/8/2020 9:36 AM

83

government must have given the contractor the authority to make the
prerecorded or autodialed calls. 104
To support its narrowed definition of “person” under the TCPA, the FCC
relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez. 105
Plaintiff claimed that Campbell-Ewald, a government contractor recruiting for
the United States Navy, violated the TCPA by sending automated text messages
to recruits who did not consent to receiving them. 106 The Court maintained that
the government and federal agencies are not subject to TCPA prohibitions, and
government contractors may claim derivative immunity when they act based on
authority properly designated to them by the federal government. 107 In
Campbell-Ewald, however, Campbell-Ewald Co. did not have derivative
immunity because Campbell-Ewald Co. sent unauthorized text messages, which
exceeded the scope of the company’s authority from the government. The Navy
gave Campbell-Ewald Co. specific instructions to “send text messages only to
individuals who had ‘opted in’ to receive solicitations.” 108 Campbell-Ewald also
promised to only use an opt-in list for sending out the text messages. 109 The
company failed to follow its grant of authority and uphold its promises to the
government and therefore lacked derivative immunity from TCPA violations. 110
The Court in Campbell-Ewald did not hold that federal contractors
categorically have the same immunity from liability under the TCPA. The Court
also did not answer the question of whether federal contractors are “persons”
under the TCPA. The Court’s holding, that federal contractors who act as agents
of the federal government under agency law have derivative immunity from the
TCPA, 111 is consistent with the FCC’s 2016 declaratory ruling. The FCC ruled
that federal contractors, or those who act as agents of the federal government,
are not “persons” subject to TCPA requirements. 112 In Campbell-Ewald,

104
Id. The FCC was concerned that based on principles of agency law, the federal government could be
held vicariously liable for the calls placed by a hired contractor. In the FCC’s DISH Declaratory Ruling, the
FCC allowed a third party placing a call under the direction of the principle to claim the same privilege belonging
to the principle. By allowing the contractors to be liable in the case, the federal government could incur vicarious
liability, which could lead to increased litigation and lawsuits. DISH Network, LLC Declaratory Ruling, 28 FCC
Rcd. 6574 6589, ¶ 38 (2013).
105
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, FCC 16-72, at
11.
106
Id. at 11
107
Id.
108
Id. at 11 (quoting Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 673–74. (2016))
109
Id.
110
Id. at 5 (citing Campbell-Ewald Co., 136 S. Ct. at 673–74).
111
Id. at 11–12.
112
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, FCC 16-72, 1,
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because the government contractor violated the government’s instructions, the
company violated the authority granted to it by the government and therefore
lost its immunity from TCPA liability. 113 Therefore, the contractor would be
considered a “person” under the TCPA. 114
The TCPA’s consent requirements for individuals to place auto-dialed or
prerecorded calls created stricter minimum standards for robocalls to be placed.
These statuary barriers to contacting consumers through robocalls raise First
Amendment questions as to whether the law unconstitutionally inhibits one’s
freedom of speech to make contact with consumers through these means.
V. FIRST AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO THE TCPA
Due to the sweeping effect that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act has
on preventing robocallers from reaching citizens, there are mounting First
Amendment concerns that the statute stifles the freedom of speech. In Martin v.
Struthers, a landmark First Amendment decision, the Supreme Court held that a
city ordinance that made it unlawful for a person to distribute “handbills,
circulars, or other advertisements to ring the door bell, sound the door knocked,
or otherwise summon the inmate or inmates of any residence to the door for the
purpose of receiving such handbills, circulars, or other advertisements” violated
the First Amendment. 115 The Court was forced to balance the interests of the
homeowner in deciding whether they would receive the message against the
interests in protecting citizens. The Court held that evaluating the dangers of
accepting the distributed materials should be left to each homeowner to decide
and that the “stringent prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by
the Constitution, the naked restriction of the dissemination of ideas.” 116
To decide whether a statute too greatly restricts the freedom of speech, the
appropriate level of scrutiny must be applied to evaluate the law. The first step
in applying the appropriate level of scrutiny requires courts to examine whether
the statute is content-based or content-neutral. 117 A content-based law is
presumed to be unconstitutional, because it regulates speech based on its subject

8 (2016) (Declaratory Ruling), https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2016/db0706/FCC-1672A1.pdf.
113
Id. at 12.
114
Id.
115
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142 (1943).
116
Id. at 146–47.
117
Minch Minchin, Article, A Doctrine at Risk: Content Neutrality in a Post-Reed Landscape, 22 COMM.
L. & POL’Y 123, 123–24 (2017).
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matter. 118 Content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny from the court, which
is the toughest form of judicial scrutiny to overcome. 119 To pass a strict scrutiny
standard of review, the law must “further a ‘compelling governmental interest,’
and must have narrowly tailored the law to achieve that interest.” 120 Justice
Thomas in Reed v. Town of Gilbert explained the standard for content-based
regulation of speech as “apply[ing] to particular speech because of the topic
discussed or the idea or message expressed.” 121 This standard “requires a court
to consider whether a regulation of speech ‘on its face’ draws distinctions based
on the message a speaker conveys.” 122 If the court cannot determine if the statute
is facially content-based, then the court is permitted to examine the purpose and
effects of the statute. 123
Content neutral laws regulate speech by limiting expression without concern
for the substance of the speech itself. 124 These laws are subject to intermediate
scrutiny. 125 Content neutral laws oftentimes address the time, place, or manner
of the speech. 126 In order to pass intermediate scrutiny, the law must “further an
important government interest . . . and must do so by means that are substantially
related to that interest.” 127
U.S. federal courts have applied this framework to determine whether the
TCPA is constitutional. First, a reviewing court must determine whether the
statute is content-based or content-neutral. Second, the appropriate level of
scrutiny is applied to the statute to determine whether its speech regulations are
permissible.

118
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224–33 (2015). In Reed, the Supreme Court invalidated an
Arizona ordinance that treated directional signs differently based on the content of the sign. For example, if the
sign gave directions to a local church or espoused a political view, then that type of sign was regulated differently
than a non-ideological sign. The majority held that content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny from the
Court. Id.
119
Minchin, supra at 124.
120
Strict Scrutiny, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny (last
visited Feb. 5, 2020).
121
Reed, at 2227.
122
Id. (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 564–66 (2011)).
123
Id. at 2227.
124
David L. Hudson, Jr., Content Neutral, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://mtsu.edu/firstamendment/article/937/content-neutral (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
125
Id.
126
Id. An example of content neutral speech is in Heffron v. International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, where Minnesota prohibited the sale of any merchandise or printed materials in parks. Id. (citing
Heffron v. International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981)).
127
Intermediate Scrutiny, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
intermediate_scrutiny (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
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A. Declaring the Debt Collection Exception Unconstitutional
In March 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Duguid v. Facebook,
Inc. declared that the 2015 debt-collection exception to the TCPA is
unconstitutional. In Duguid, Facebook began to send Duguid text messages in
January 2014, even though Duguid did not have a Facebook account. Duguid
tried to opt-out of the messages by sending an email requesting Facebook cease
sending the text messages. The messages continued to be sent to Duguid.
Facebook argued that the pleadings should be dismissed, because the messages
fall under the emergency purpose exception under the TCPA. 128 The FCC has
defined the emergency purpose exception to mean “calls made necessary in any
situation affecting the health and safety of consumers.” 129
Along with its emergency purpose defense, the Ninth Circuit held that
Facebook has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the TCPA and the
amendments made to the Act in 2015. The first inquiry in a First Amendment
analysis is whether the TCPA is a content neutral or content-based statute. 130
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co. held that
the pre-2015 amended TCPA was content-neutral and passed intermediate
scrutiny. 131 The court in Duguid followed its own precedent that the TCPA was
narrowly tailored and advanced the “‘government’s significant interest in
residential privacy’ and left open ‘ample alternative channels of
communication.’” 132 Yet, the court further held that adding the debt-collection
exception to the consent requirements for robocalls changes the nature of the
TCPA and the First Amendment analysis framework. 133 With the debt collection
exception, the TCPA places favor in speech whose purpose is to collect a debt
owed to or guaranteed by the United States. This exception makes the statute
content-based, because it examines speech for exemptions based on its content.
Therefore, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny. 134
Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the government must demonstrate that
differentiating between robocalls to collect debts owed to or guaranteed by the
United States is a compelling interest and that the statute is narrowly tailored to
128
Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1149–57 (9th Cir. 2019). An example of an emergency
relevant to Facebook would be a Facebook account security problem. Id. at 1152.
129
47 C.F.R. § 64.1200 (2020).
130
Duguid, at 1153.
131
Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2014).
132
Duguid at 1153 (quoting Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 973–74 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Gomez v.
Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2014)).
133
Id. at 1153.
134
Id. at 1153–54.
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further that interest. 135 The government argues that its compelling interest is in
the protection of personal privacy. 136 The court did not find this convincing since
robocalls to collect debts infringe on the debtor’s privacy, and robocalls in
general are typically considered to be invasive of privacy regardless of the
purpose. The court reasoned that when citizens consent to robocalls, they are
typically less intrusive of people’s privacy. The notion of giving consent to
receive the call begins to lessen any heightened expectation of privacy that one
may normally have. 137 By not requiring consent for robocalls to collect debts
owed to or guaranteed by the United States, the government’s own stated interest
is not being met. 138
The government also offers an alternative interest aimed at protecting the
public’s financial interests. 139 Even if this is a compelling interest, the court does
not believe that the debt collection exception is the least restrictive means to
achieve its goals. 140 The 2015 statute could have addressed the nature of the
relationship between the debt collector and the debtor, instead of the content of
the call, which would have made the statute content-neutral. 141 By creating an
exemption based on the relationship between the government and the debtor,
instead of based on speech relating to debt collection, the statute would have
avoided regulating the content of the speech. The court also asserts that the
government could have either had live callers contacting debtors or could have
decided to place the calls itself. 142
The Ninth Circuit held that because the debt-collection exception is contentbased and is not narrowly tailored to the government’s compelling interest, it
violates the First Amendment. 143 Some courts also examine whether the
regulated speech constitutes commercial speech, which is a form of speech that
is recognized as reflecting the economic interests of the parties. It is subject to
intermediate scrutiny due to the government’s higher interest in regulating
economic information directed to consumers. 144 An explanation and analysis of
commercial speech will be provided below.

135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

Id. at 1154–56.
Id.
Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1154–56 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1155.
Id. at 1156.
Id.
Id.
Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1156 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 558–73 (1980).
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VI. FIRST AMENDMENT CONCERNS: COMMERCIAL SPEECH
When applying the First Amendment to determine whether a statute or
regulation violates a person’s freedom of speech, the Supreme Court has
recognized commercial speech as have its own category of regulated speech.
The Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public
Service Commission of New York defined commercial speech and set forth the
applicable First Amendment test for regulating commercial speech.145 The
Supreme Court defined commercial speech as an “expression related solely to
the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” 146 Commercial speech
serves the speaker’s economic interests as well as society’s interest in receiving
the “fullest possible dissemination of information.” 147 The Supreme Court in
Central Hudson also decided that commercial speech receives an intermediate
level of scrutiny. 148 In deciding to apply an intermediate level of scrutiny, the
Court recognized that in traditional commercial speech, such as providing
information through advertising, there is a greater governmental interest in
suppressing messages that do not accurately inform consumers of relevant
information. 149
The Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council held that for commercial speech, “a different degree of
protection is necessary to ensure that the flow of truthful and legitimate
commercial information is unimpaired.” 150 In crafting its own intermediate
scrutiny analysis to determine whether a statute or regulation improperly
infringes on commercial speech, a court must examine:
(1) Does the speech constitute a misleading or unlawful activity?
a. If the speech is misleading or unlawful, then
it is not protected under the First
Amendment.
(2) Does the state have a substantial interest in regulating the speech?
145

Id. at 558–66.
Id. at 561.
147
Id. at 561–62.
148
Id. at 573. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting agreement with the majority that an intermediate level
of scrutiny for commercial speech is appropriate).
149
Id. at 560–72.
150
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772 n. 24 (1976)). In Friedman, the Supreme Court held that a Texas state
statute prohibiting optometrists from using a trade name did not violate the First Amendment. The Court held
that a trade name is a type of advertising for the types of services and goods that an optometrist provides its
patients. The statute was upheld since it merely requires that the information portrayed to customers is accurate
and not deceptive. This restriction does not prevent informational advertising to consumers. Id.
146
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(3) Does the regulation directly advance the state’s interest?
(4) Does the regulation achieve its goal by proportionate measures?
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100
S. Ct. 2343, 2351 (1980). In Central Hudson, the Public Service Commission of
the State of New York issued an order in December 1973 stating that all electric
utilities across the state must stop all advertising that promotes electricity use. 151
At the time of the order, the Commission found that the state did not have enough
fuel to meet customer demands. Three years later, the fuel shortage eased and
the Commission extended the prohibition to include promotional advertising. 152
In making this decision, the Commission relied on the nation’s interest in
preserving energy and its own interest in saving costs associated with energy
production. 153
In applying its four-factor analysis, the Court in Central Hudson first
recognized that the electric utilities’ speech is neither misleading nor
unlawful. 154 Second, the state’s interests is banning promotional advertising
includes energy conservation and preventing extra energy costs for consumers
during peak periods of energy use. Both of these concerns represent substantial
government interests. 155
Third, the Court examines whether the regulation directly advances the
state’s interests. The state’s interest in protecting energy costs has too indirect
and speculative of a connection between the banned advertising and the
perceived harm. 156 On the other hand, the state’s interest in conserving energy
use has an “immediate connection between advertising and demand for
electricity.” 157 Under the fourth criteria, the Court held that the total ban on
151

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 558 (1980).
Id. at 559.
153
Id. at 558–60.
154
Id. at 566–68. One example of speech that does not receive First Amendment protection from the court
is someone proposing to sell illegal drugs to another person. Because this is an unlawful activity, the commercial
speech does not receive First Amendment protection and the Central Hudson test is not applied. A second
example of unprotected speech is when a website author presents their site as collecting donations for hurricane
relief when the money is actually going to a college student. This second example demonstrates misleading
speech that would not receive First Amendment protection. Andrew L. Sullivant, Leave Me Alone! The Delicate
Balance of Privacy and Commercial Speech in the Evolving Do-Not-Call Registry, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 251,
258–59 (2008–2009).
155
Id. at 568–69.
156
Id. at 569. The court highlighted that there are other factors that could impact energy costs outside of
promotional advertising. The link between promotional advertising during off-peak energy use periods and
increased energy use during peak-use periods is too indirect of a link to justify regulating commercial speech.
Id.
157
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 569 (1980).
152
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promotional advertisements is more extensive than necessary to achieve the
state’s goal. 158 The appellant in this case argues that it would advertise products
that are energy efficient, and the Commission failed to discredit those efficient
alternative energy sources. In addition, the Commission could have only
restricted the content of the advertising by requiring certain information to
accompany the promotional materials so that consumers are more aware of
energy concerns and energy prices. 159 For these reasons, the regulation of the
commercial speech violates the First Amendment. 160
Even though Central Hudson reviews commercial speech under intermediate
scrutiny, there is uncertainty regarding whether the Supreme Court’s decision in
Reed v. Town of Gilbert forces commercial speech into a strict scrutiny standard
of review. In Reed, the Court held that facially content-based regulations are
subject to strict scrutiny regardless of the government’s motive or contentneutral justification. 161 One school of thought is that the Court in Reed did not
signal that it intended to subsume Central Hudson’s commercial speech test, did
not reference Central Hudson in its reasoning, and that the sign regulations in
Reed did not involve commercial speech. 162 In a decision from the Northern
District of California, the opinion stated, “The Supreme Court has clearly made
a distinction between commercial speech and noncommercial speech, and
nothing in its recent opinions, including Reed, even comes close to suggesting
that that well-established distinction is no longer valid.” 163
Even though subsequent case law has distinguished commercial speech from
a content-based strict scrutiny standard of review, other courts have held that
strict scrutiny applies as long as the commercial speech is also content-based.
Because the TCPA prohibits the use of autodialers when the express consent of
the consumer is missing, this limitation is more likely to affect conveying certain
types of information. 164 Autodialers could relay telemarketing calls that qualify
as commercial speech or could place calls relating to an individual’s financial
information or personal health information. 165 One could argue that because

158

Id. at 569–70.
Id. at 569–71.
160
Id. at 558.
161
Free Speech Doctrine After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1981, 1986–87 (2016) (citing
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015)).
162
Id. at 1990–92.
163
Id. at 1991–92 (quoting CTIA - The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1061
(N.D. Cal. 2015)).
164
Justin Hurwitz, Telemarketing, Technology, and the Regulation of Private Speech: FIRST
AMENDMENT LESSONS FROM THE FCC’S TCPA RULES, 84 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 50–51 (2018).
165
Id. Using automated calls to relay this information is preferred since it reduces the chances that a
159
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certain messages are better suited for autodialers, the content of speech relayed
by autodialers is being regulated by the TPCA’s requirements. 166 Because this
is a content-based restriction, a court that is unwilling to differentiate between
commercial speech and content-based speech would treat this provision under a
strict scrutiny standard of review. In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., a Vermont
statute “restricts the sale, disclosure, and use for pharmacy records that reveal
the prescribing practices of individual doctors.” 167 The Court reasoned that on
its face, the law is a content-based restriction on the “sale, disclosure, and use of
prescriber-identifying information.” 168 Because the statute bars the sale or
disclosure of the information for marketing purposes, which demonstrates a
disfavor of marketing, the statute is regulating “particular content.” 169 The Court
points to legislative findings to demonstrate that due to the law’s purpose of
“diminish[ing] the effectiveness of marketing by manufacturers of brand-name
drugs,” 170 coupled with the content restriction on a type of speech, that Vermont
is engaging in content-based view-point discrimination. 171
Along with the statute’s restrictions on marketing-related speech, Sorrell
asserts that content-based regulation on commercial speech is justified to get a
higher level of scrutiny when the government has a “legitimate interest in
protecting consumers from ‘commercial harms.’” 172 The Supreme Court in
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. asserted that because of the greater risk
for confusion or deception in advertising messages, statutes can impose contentbased restrictions on commercial language. 173 In Bolger, a federal law prohibited
the unsolicited mailing of advertisements for contraceptives. 174 The Court in
Bolger relies on four factors taken together to hold that the mailings constitute
commercial speech: (1) the speech proposes a commercial transaction, (2) the
mailers consist of advertisements, (3) the advertisements refer to a specific
product, and (4) the senders had an economic motivation for mailing the
materials. 175 The Court maintained that the appellants’ argument for shielding
consumer’s personal information is leaked. Having a live person placing the call risks the confidentiality of the
consumer’s personal information. Id.
166
Id.
167
Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011). The law prohibits pharmacies and health insurers
from selling prescriber information and bars pharmacies from allowing prescriber-identifying information from
being sold for marketing purposes. Id.
168
Id. at 564.
169
Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 563–64.
170
Id. at 565.
171
Id. 564–65.
172
Id. at 579 (quoting Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993)).
173
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 61 (1983).
174
Id.
175
Id. at 66–67.
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people from getting these mailed materials because they may be found offensive
is “classically not a justification validating the suppression of expression
protected by the First Amendment.” 176
As will be seen below, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Duguid refused
to apply intermediate scrutiny, because Facebook’s messages did not amount to
commercial speech. When reviewing the constitutionality of the TCPA with the
debt collection exemption, the Duguid court applied a strict scrutiny standard of
review to the TCPA. This decision was ultimately based on whether the statute
on its face regulates or restricts forms of speech. 177
VII. TCPA: IS STRICT SCRUTINY OR INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY PROPER?
Without the 2015 debt collection exception to TCPA consent requirements,
the TCPA was viewed as a content-neutral law designed to protect consumer
privacy. 178 In Duguid, the plaintiffs argued that the exception for debt-collection
calls made on behalf of the government is a content-based regulation subjecting
the TCPA to strict scrutiny. 179 The United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York also followed this trend in its Mejia v. Time Warner Cable
decision, in which the court also decided to apply strict scrutiny to the TCPA
when examining the exemption for autodialed calls made in relation to debts
guaranteed by the United States. 180 Notably, the court recognized that the TCPA
makes several distinctions between calls beyond just the debt collection
exemption, such as between pre-recorded and autodialed calls versus live callers,
as well as between calls made to wireless phones versus calls made to residential
landline phones. 181 These distinctions amount to content-based regulations of
speech.
Before applying a strict scrutiny standard of review, the definition of
commercial speech can be applied to determine whether TCPA communications
constitute commercial speech. In Duguid under a TCPA analysis, the Ninth
Circuit rejected applying intermediate scrutiny to Facebook’s messages because
the speech did not satisfy its court’s own definition of commercial speech used
176

Id. at 71 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 681 (1977)).
Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1149–57 (9th Cir. 2019).
178
Gomez v. Campbell-Ewald Co., 768 F.3d 871, 876–77 (9th Cir. 2014); see Duguid v. Facebook, Inc.,
926 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 973–74 (9th Cir. 1995).
179
Duguid, 926 F.3d at 1153.
180
Justin Hurwitz, Telemarketing, Technology, and the Regulation of Private Speech, 84 BROOKLYN L.
REV. at 46–47 (citing Mejia v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No. 15-CV-6445 (JPO), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120445,
at *45 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2017).
181
Id. at 50
177
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in Hunt v. City of Los Angeles. 182 The Ninth Circuit in Hunt stated that
commercial speech is “‘defined as speech that does no more than propose a
commercial transaction’. . . . Where the facts present a close question, ‘strong
support’ that the speech should be characterized as commercial speech is found
where the speech is an advertisement, the speech refers to a particular product,
and the speaker has an economic motivation.” 183 In Duguid, the plaintiff did not
have a Facebook account, was alerted to nonexistent account activity, and the
messages did not advertise or relate to any product for purchase. 184 Therefore,
these security messages sent by an automated system do not constitute
commercial speech.
The primary goal of the TCPA is to protect home privacy interests and one’s
interests in being free from unwanted communications. 185 Under the Reed
analysis, after determining if a statute on its face regulates content, the
congressional intent or preference for speech can be inferred. 186 Congress
arguably had a preference for live speakers over pre-recorded telemarketers,
which revealed a content preference against advertising and solicitations. 187 Yet,
Congress did not fully consider the utility of auto-dialed or pre-recorded calls.
As the prevalence of wireless phones has increased and as businesses have more
strongly relied on automated calls or pre-recorded calls to relay personal
information, growing portions of content-based speech are being infringed upon
by statute. 188 For example, pre-recorded calls may seek to deliver sensitive
information in a secure manner. 189 In examining whether the calls constitute
commercial speech, many of these pre-recorded calls do not propose a
commercial transaction. Instead, they relay pertinent messages to consumers to
keep them informed of various aspects of their lives. Because of the utility of
these calls in relaying personal information to consumers in a secure manner,
the trend in applying a strict scrutiny level of analysis should continue for TCPA
regulated calls and FCC regulations that implement the TCPA.

182

Duguid, 926 F.3d at 1154 n.4.
Id. (citing Hunt v. City of L.A., 638 F.3d 703, 715 (9th Cir. 2011)).
184
Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1149–57 (9th Cir. 2019).
185
Justin Hurwitz, Telemarketing, Technology, and the Regulation of Private Speech, 84 BROOKLYN L.
REV. at 16–18.
186
Id. at 33.
187
Id. at 51–52.
188
Id. at 52–53.
189
Id. Examples of these calls could include updates on personal finances, travels information, medical
information (including prescriptions or appointment reminders), or civic information. Id.
183
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VIII. TRACED ACT
A. The Creation of the TRACED Act
On December 31, 2019, President Trump signed the Pallone-Thune
Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act
(TRACED Act). 190 The law amends the TCPA to give power to the federal
government to produce stronger response mechanisms and solutions to combat
robocalls. The Act allows the FCC to have a longer statute of limitations to
pursue illegal robocallers and permits imposing larger fines that will create a
greater deterrent effect on robocallers. 191 Specifically, the FCC is permitted to
prosecute first-time robocallers for up to four years after the call. Fines for an
intentional violation can total up to $10,000. 192
The Act calls on the FCC to establish an interagency task force to address
the prosecution of illegal robocalls and the enforcement of robocall statutes. 193
Section 5 of the Act gives authority to the Department of Justice to prosecute
robocalling violations that cause “economic harm, physical danger, or erosion
of an inhabitant’s peace of mind and sense of security.” 194 The interagency
working group is to be composed of the Attorney General, and representatives
from the Department of Commerce, the Department of State, the Department of
Homeland Security, the Federal Communications Commission, and Federal
Trade Commission, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. 195 The
Attorney General is also permitted to include non-federal stakeholders with
relevant expertise in the working group as they see fit. 196 The working group is
tasked with submitting a report to Congress on recommendations regarding the
“(1) prevention and prosecution of such violations; and (2) a description of what
progress . . . relevant Federal departments . . . have made.” 197

190
Mitchell Brecher & Debra McGuire Mercer, TRACED Act Subjects Robocallers to Increased Penalties,
Outlines Regulatory and Reporting Requirements to Deter Violations, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Jan. 8,
2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/traced-act-subjects-robocallers-to-increased-penalties-outlinesregulatory-and.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence (TRACED) Act,
Pub. L. No. 116-105, § 5(a), 113 Stat. 3274.
194
TRACED Act § 5(b)(g).
195
TRACED Act § 5(c).
196
TRACED Act § 5(d). An example as a non-federal stakeholder with relevant expertise is a
representative from the National Association of Attorneys General. Id.
197
TRACED Act § 5(e).
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B. Barriers to Contact
Along with its enforcement directives for federal agencies, the TRACED
Act calls on all phone carriers to implement a STIR/SHAKEN Authentication
Framework. 198 This framework seeks to combat spoofing, which disguises an
incoming phone number on caller-ID as a local number, making it more likely
that someone answers the call. 199 The FCC is required to mandate that phone
providers implement the STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework in areas
with Internet access or to take reasonable steps to implement a similar call
authentication system in areas without Internet access within 18 months of the
passage of the Act. 200 In areas with internet access, the FCC is instructed that if
a phone provider has not adopted the STIR/SHAKEN authentication framework,
has not agreed to participate in the STIR/SHAKEN framework, has not begun
to implement the STIR/SHAKEN framework, or will not be capable of
implementing the STIR/SHAKEN framework no later than 18 months after the
passage of the Act, then the FCC shall penalize the carrier no later than 12
months after the passage of the Act. 201
The TRACED Act includes a Safe Harbor provision, which charges the FCC
to promulgate rules no later than one year after the passage of the Act that protect
carriers from mistakes they may make when blocking calls. 202 A phone provider
is excused form liability for inadvertent call blocking when a call is misidentified
due to their call authentication frameworks. In addition, the party that is
adversely affected by the authentication framework may pre-emptively seek to
verify the authenticity of their calls. 203 The Safe Harbor provision also ensures
that a carrier’s implementation of its call blocking framework cannot be added
as an additional line item charge on a customer’s monthly phone bill. 204
198
SHAKEN/STIR are standards employed when a call is travelling through “interconnected phone
networks . . . [and] are ‘signed’ as legitimate by originating carriers and validated by other carriers before
reaching consumers. SHAKEN/STIR digitally validates the handoff of phone calls passing through the complex
web of networks, allowing the phone company of the consumer receiving the call to verify that a call is from the
person making it.” Combatting Spoofed Robocalls with Caller Id Authentication, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/callauthentication (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
199
“Spoofing is when a caller deliberately falsifies the information transmitted to your caller ID display
to disguise their identity. Scammers often use neighbor spoofing so it appears that an incoming call is coming
from a local number, or spoof a number from a company or a government agency that you may already know
and trust.” Caller ID Spoofing, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/spoofing-and-caller-id (last visited
Feb. 6, 2020).
200
Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence (TRACED) Act,
Pub. L. No. 116-105, §§ 4(b)(1)-4(b)(2), 113 Stat. 3274.
201
TRACED Act § 4(b)(2)(A).
202
TRACED Act § 4(c).
203
Id.
204
Id.
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In conjunction with the FCC’s June 2019 Declaratory Ruling permitting
consumers to opt-out of their phone carrier from proactively blocking
robocalls, 205 the TRACED Act stipulates that no later than 1 year after the
passage of the Act, the Commission is charged with issuing a rule that ensures
that robocall blocking services are provided to consumers with an opt-in or optout option. 206 The law requires that these services be provided at no additional
charge to the consumer and that carriers should “make all reasonable efforts to
avoid blocking emergency public safety calls.” 207
Section 8 of the TRACED Act states that there may be parties who are
exempt from the statute’s consent requirements. 208 Under the TCPA, FCC
regulations, and Supreme Court holdings, auto-dialed and pre-recorded calls
placed by the government and authorized government agents are exempt from
having to secure written consent to contact individuals. 209 Previously, this has
been reasoned by emphasizing that the purpose of these calls, which is
oftentimes to relay important information to citizens, is too important of a
message to subject to further regulation. 210 Section 8 stipulates that for any
exemptions to robocall requirements, the FCC shall ensure that those calls are
regulated as to “(1) the classes of parties that may make such calls; (ii) the classes
of parties that may be called; and (iii) the number of such calls that a calling
party may make to a particular called party.” 211
IX. DISCUSSION
While it is important that consumers are protected from deceptive debt
collection practices, it is also important to ensure that debt collection
communications are not effectively eliminated altogether. Debt collection serves
a valid purpose in ensuring that creditors are paid back for their loans. Ultimate
failure by the debtor to repay these loans could have a dire impact on businesses
that need to recover their loaned funds. In the discussion section, this Comment

205
Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, Call Authentication Trust Anchor,
47 C.F.R. §64 (2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-51A1.pdf.
206
Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence (TRACED) Act,
Pub. L. No. 116-105, § 10(b), 113 Stat. 3274.
207
TRACED Act § 10(b)(j)(1)(C).
208
TRACED Act § 8.
209
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, FCC 16-72, 1,
8 (2016) (Declaratory Ruling), https://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2016/db0706/FCC-1672A1.pdf; see Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 673–74. (2016)).
210
Justin Hurwitz, Telemarketing, Technology, and the Regulation of Private Speech: FIRST
AMENDMENT LESSONS FROM THE FCC’S TCPA RULES, 84 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 50–51 (2018).
211
TRACED Act § 8.
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will address FCC and CFPB regulatory shortcomings and solutions to these
problems. Then, First Amendment analyses of the FDCPA and the TRACED
Act will be conducted to determine whether the statutes withstand a First
Amendment analysis by a reviewing court.
A. Regulatory Concerns
The FCC’s June 2019 declaratory ruling permitting opt-in call blocking tools
bases its utilization of the tools on over-broad standards. 212 Phone carriers
deciding whether to block a call from a phone number is based on factors that
include, “large bursts of calls in a short timeframe; low average call duration;
low call completion ratios . . . a large volume of complaints related to a suspect
line, [and] sequential dialing patterns.” 213 Phone calls from debt collectors could
have these characteristics, such as short call times and low call completion ratios,
by virtue of the topic of the call. A consumer evading payment on a debt may
hang up the phone once they hear that it is a debt collector or an automated voice
on the other end of line. In addition, consumers having the option to block all
calls from unknown numbers limits contact with debt collectors but also has
wide ranging repercussions for other businesses with similar call
characteristics. 214
Along with these regulatory limitations, the FDCPA has also greatly limited
whom consumers speak with. Under the FDCPA, debtors are entitled to tell debt
collectors that they wish to cease communication.215 The Supreme Court in
Heintz v. Jenkins assured that a debtor would not be able to cut off litigation by
ceasing communications, because the debt collector could argue that their
communication with the debtor qualified as an effort to discuss either a special
remedy or the pending litigation. 216 Yet, contact by the debt collector’s lawyers
to the creditor relating to the debt may result in further violation of the
FDCPA. 217 The Supreme Court is mistaken with its proposed defenses.
Discussing the pending litigation, which could address settling a case or
requesting documents for discovery, inherently relates to the debt collection
212
Advanced Methods to Target and Eliminate Unlawful Robocalls, Call Authentication Trust Anchor,
47 C.F.R. §64 ¶25 (2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-51A1.pdf.
213
Id. at §64 ¶35 (2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-19-51A1.pdf.
214
For example, a health care provider or a local municipality with pre-recorded or autodialed calls could
experience similarly low call completion rates and low average call durations.
215
KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS.
216
Mattson, supra §1.06. (citing Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 292–99 (1995)).
217
Romine, 155 F.3d at 1146 (quoting Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 297–98 (1995)) (“Litigation . . .
seems simply one way of collecting debt.”).
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efforts. These FDCPA limitations could make it nearly impossible to
communicate about a case without invoking additional FDCPA liability.
To address these issues, the CFPB’s final rule should include clear
exceptions for debt collection agencies that are trying to communicate with
debtors on matters regarding official recourse and pending litigation. An
example of permissible contact should include all communications between the
attorneys of both parties. If the CFPB was actually concerned that litigation
could qualify as communication with the debtor to retrieve owed debts, the rule
would provide a total bar for communication between the creditor’s attorney and
the debtor. As a solution, the rule could mandate that if communication directly
with the debtor was absolutely necessary, or if the debtor is representing pro se,
then communication must be done before a judge, mediator, or court appointed
officer to ensure fair communication practices. By allowing necessary
communication in a controlled and specific manner, debt collectors will be able
to seek redress for harms suffered with less concern for whether they are
exposing themselves to additional liability.
In order to resolve the issue of consumers becoming completely unreachable
to debt collectors, a reporting system could be created that would require debt
collectors to submit annual data to the FCC, the CFPB, and Congress to
demonstrate a good faith basis for communicating with consumers. If these
entities list their legitimate purposes in contacting consumers within reasonable
constraints imposed by statute or regulation, such as only placing calls during
normal day-time hours and not dialing debtors while they are working at their
place of employment, then they should enjoy greater leeway from the federal
government in not having their communications limited or blocked from
reaching consumers. Including call times and the number of completed calls will
also provide concrete and accurate data for the FCC’s measure of reasonable
analytics. 218 By allowing debt collectors greater leeway based on good behavior
mechanisms, collectors will have greater incentives to comply with federal
regulations and regain public trust.
Federal agencies could also move to require debt collectors to make live
phone calls whose contents are recorded for monitoring purposes. Monitoring
these calls could help to ensure that collectors do not employ harassment
techniques. By forcing collectors to only use live phone calls, the number of
218
The FCC’s 2019 declaratory ruling permitted phone companies to utilize reasonable analytics to
determine whether a call should be blocked from a consumer’s phone. FCC AFFIRMS ROBOCALL BLOCKING BY
DEFAULT TO HELP PROTECT CONSUMERS, Federal Comm. Commission (June 6, 2019), https://docs.fcc.gov/
public/attachments/DOC-357852A1.pdf.
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deceptive and harassing pre-recorded or auto-dialed calls could decrease, debt
collectors could work to ensure that they are paid back in full, and debt collection
calls would still be able to reach debtors for their intended purpose.
In addition, the CFPB should take more seriously the issue of regulating
limited content messages. 219 The CFPB’s notice of proposed rulemaking fails to
provide clear protections to consumers on how they can protect themselves and
opt-out of receiving text messages, e-mails, and voicemails from debt
collectors. 220 The notice lacked guidance to the public on whether the agency is
leaning towards favoring a cap on the number of limited content messages that
can be sent to consumers within a given period. 221 The National Consumer Law
Center highlights that the CFPB should ensure that consumers are able to
directly opt-out of receiving limited content messages on the platform from
which they receive messages, instead of requiring formal and time consuming
opt-out procedures via written mail. 222 Consumers should be able to send a reply
text message or dial a callback number to indicate that they wish to opt-out of
receiving further limited content messages. In addition, the CFPB should
commit to placing maximum caps on the number of limited content messages
sent to debtors. By allowing an unlimited number of messages to be sent,
individuals will be inundated with communications that will make rectifying
their debts even more confusing and cumbersome. 223
In conclusion, the FCC and CFPB should work to create clearer measures
and tools to aid debt collectors in recovering debts without incurring additional
liability from federal agencies. Congress has enacted statutes that seek to both
regulate debt collection practices and restrict robocalls. Robocalls encompass a
wider array of solicitation calls beyond just debt collection. By strictly regulating
these calls, greater First Amendment concerns arise over whether the statutes
violate the freedom of speech. The FDCPA and the TRACED Act will both be
analyzed. For each statute, this Comment will examine whether the statutes are
219
Limited-content message is a term used to identify the amount of information that a debt collector is
allowed to include in messages sent to consumers without invoking the requirements of being a communication
under the FDCPA. Examples typically include text messages, e-mails, and voicemails. Debt Collection Practices
Act (Regulation F), 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006 at 6 (2019), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_debtcollection-NPRM.pdf.
220
The notice only proposes that limited content messages provide instructions to consumers on how to
opt-out of receiving the messages. The notice fails to outline simple or modern methods on how consumers
should be allowed to opt-out. Debt Collection Practices Act (Regulation F), supra at 7.
221
Debt Collection Practices Act (Regulation F), supra at 6–7.
222
CFPB Debt Collection Rule Must Protect Consumers, Not Abusive Collections May 2019, NATIONAL
CONSUMER LAW CENTER 1, 1 (2019), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/debt_collection/cfpb-debt-collectionrule-summary-2019.pdf.
223
Id.
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content-based, content-neutral, or constitute commercial speech. Then the
appropriate level of scrutiny will be applied to the statutes to determine whether
the statutes are constitutionally permissible under the First Amendment.
B. First Amendment Statutory Concerns
The policies set forth by the FDCPA and TRACED Act both restrict callers
and include provisions that allow phone carriers and consumers to implement
and utilize systems that would block robocalls from reaching consumers’
phones. With governmental authority to both preemptively block calls and
implement the STIR/SHAKEN framework, the issue arises of whether these
call-blocking technologies stifle speech. Each of these laws will be evaluated
based on their content and whether they constitute commercial speech. 224 To
determine whether the statutes violate the First Amendment, the appropriate
level of scrutiny will be applied to the laws. The FDCPA will be evaluated first
and the TRACED Act will be evaluated second.
1. First Amendment and the FDCPA
It is important to examine the FDCPA to determine whether the statute sets
forth permissible constraints on speech relating to debt collection under the First
Amendment. First, to determine whether the FDCPA’s requirements violate the
First Amendment, one must decide whether the statute is content-neutral or
content-based. 225 There is a strong argument that the statute is content-based and
violates the First Amendment. The statute on its face directly limits speech
relating to debt collection. It does so by specifically regulating the manner by
which debt collection calls are made, prohibiting inappropriate and harassing
content, and granting debtors the ability to end all communication relating to the
debt. 226 The intended individuals affected by the statute are debt collectors.
Because the statute on its face expresses a preference disfavoring debt collection

224
Because the constitutionality of the TCPA was challenged under a First Amendment framework in
Duguid v. Facebook, Inc. and Mejia v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., the statute is omitted from the First Amendment
analysis.
225
Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir. 2019); See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.
Ct. at 2224–33 (explaining that content-based statutes are presumed to be unconstitutional, because they regulate
speech based on its subject matter; See (David L. Hudson, Jr., Content Neutral, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://mtsu.edu/first-amendment/article/937/content-neutral (last visited Feb. 5, 2020)
(explaining that content-neutral statutes regulate speech by limiting expression without concern for the substance
of the speech itself, oftentimes by regulating the time, place, and manner of the speech).
226
KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS.
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calls and singles out a specific class of individuals, 227 the statute is content-based
and is analyzed under a strict scrutiny standard of review. 228
Even though the statute appears to be content-based, one could argue that
the regulated speech qualifies as commercial speech. The debt collection calls
being placed represent the economic interests of the creditor, and public policy
favors consumers having an expansive knowledge of information that directly
relates to their financial interests. 229 Under a Central Hudson intermediate
scrutiny analysis, 230 we will first presume that the debt collection practices are
not misleading or unlawful activity. Second, the state arguably has a substantial
interest in regulating this speech to prevent harmful debt collection practices.
However, under the third prong of the Central Hudson commercial speech
analysis, the regulations limiting the manner through which the calls are placed
do not directly advance the state’s interest in regulating harmful debt collection
practices. The FDCPA asserts that people who collect consumer debts that are
not at default at the time of purchase of the debt are not held as debt collectors
under the meaning of the statute. By failing to regulate debt collectors who are
taking advantage of debtors who are unaware of whether their debt is actually in
default, the statute is under inclusive in preventing harmful debt collection
practices and fails to directly advance the state’s interest.
Under the fourth prong of the Central Hudson analysis, 231 the FDCPA does
not achieve its goal by proportionate means. Under the statute, debt collectors
cannot cause the phone to ring repeatedly and continuously with the intent to
“annoy, abuse, or harass” the person who is called. 232 The consumer is also
permitted to notify the debt collector that they either refuse to pay the debt or
express their wish for the debt collector to stop further communication. 233 These
provisions are not proportionate to the goals of the Act. Determining whether a
caller had the intent to annoy or harass a debtor seems like an entirely subjective
analysis that cannot be found by a trier of fact without some form of call logging
by the debt collector. In addition, allowing a debtor to cut off all communication

227
The Supreme Court in Reed v. Town of Gilbert recognized that singling out a particular group via
statute is not dispositive of a statute being content-based. Rather, this factor should be analyzed with the totality
of the statute. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230–31 (2015).
228
Id. at 2227.
229
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561–62 (1980).
230
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 2351
(1980).
231
Id.
232
15 U.S.C.S. § 1692(d) (LexisNexis 2019).
233
KURT R. MATTSON, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION
§1.06 (2019), LEXISNEXIS.
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from a debt collector, who may have good reason to regularly contact a debtor,
is an overly broad moratorium on creditor-debtor contact that precludes
productive and informative conversations between the two sides. Because the
statute is not able to satisfy the Central Hudson four-part inquiry, the FDCPA
would fail a commercial speech First Amendment analysis.
If the speech does not constitute commercial speech and is held as being
content-based, then under a strict scrutiny analysis, it would fail. 234 The
government could argue that there is a compelling government interest to protect
individuals from debt collection calls that harass debtors. However, the statute
is not narrowly tailored to achieve this goal. The statute is over-inclusive,
because it permits individuals to cut off communication with creditors. 235 For
example, attorneys for the debt collector, after being notified of debtor’s wishes
to end communications, have to avoid communications with the debtor that are
not specifically related to the unfolding litigation, which puts the debt collector
in a difficult position to decipher whether the communication regarding
litigation actually relates to the subject of debt collection. This is very nuanced
and easily subject to error by even the most careful of attorneys or parties. In
addition, repeated phone calls can easily be viewed as harassment. In reality, a
debt collector who is trying to reach a debtor may have called back after the
phone line was disconnected. The debt collector may have the purpose of
making honest and well-intentioned contact with a debtor. However, the statute
presupposes mal-intent, placing debt collectors immediately in the realm of
harassment and liability. Because the statute is over-inclusive and is not
narrowly tailored to achieve its goal, it should fail a strict scrutiny analysis by
the court.
2. First Amendment and the TRACED Act
The TRACED Act must first be evaluated to determine whether the statute
is content-neutral or content-based. The TRACED Act would most likely be
considered a content-neutral statute, because unlike the TCPA, the law does not
make specific exceptions for particular types of calls. The statute is concerned
with stopping illegal robocalls and implements frameworks to prevent spoofing,
which is a deceptive practice that does not constitute a particular type of
234
One could argue that the regulated speech does not constitute commercial speech, because under the
Supreme Court’s commercial speech factor analysis in Bolger, the reviewing court would need to know that the
regulations restricts speech relating to advertisements and products for sale. Collecting debts may not necessarily
qualify as satisfying either of these two categories. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66–67
(1983).
235
Mattson, supra.
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protected speech. 236 Because the statute is content-neutral, it will fall under an
intermediate scrutiny analysis. 237 To pass intermediate scrutiny, the statute must
further an important government interest and must do so by means that are
substantially related to that interest. 238 Here, the government’s interest in
preventing robocalls that harass and invade the privacy of consumers is likely to
be viewed as an important goal. In addition, the government’s mandate to
carriers to adopt the STIR/SHAKEN frameworks is substantially related to that
interest. Under an intermediate scrutiny analysis, the statute would most likely
not violate the First Amendment.
The issue of whether the calls constitute commercial speech is immaterial.
First, the statute is content-neutral, which ensures an intermediate level of
scrutiny. Second, the TRACED Act seeks to curb illegal robocalls and combats
fraudulent spoofing calls from reaching consumers. The Supreme Court in
Central Hudson asserted that the First Amendment does not protect illegal
speech, 239 and the TRACED Act is concerned with combatting illegal calls and
preventing callers from fraudulently hiding their identities from consumers. 240
Central Hudson defined commercial speech as, “expression related solely to the
economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” 241 If the robocall is placed
for fraudulent purposes, then call does not pertain to a true economic interest of
the audience and should not be considered commercial speech. Because the
statute is mainly concerned with illegal robocalls that serve no utility and
deceive the consumer into answering the phone, the calls do not elevate to the
status of constituting commercial speech. 242
Section 8 of the TRACED Act grants the FCC the authority to implement
additional protections for consumers from robocalls that can be placed without

236
Combatting Spoofed Robocalls with Caller Id Authentication, FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/callauthentication (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
237
David L. Hudson, Jr., Content Neutral, THE FIRST AMENDMENT ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://mtsu.edu/firstamendment/article/937/content-neutral (last visited Feb. 5, 2020).
238
Id.
239
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 2351
(1980).
240
Mitchell Brecher & Debra McGuire Mercer, TRACED Act Subjects Robocallers to Increased Penalties,
Outlines Regulatory and Reporting Requirements to Deter Violations, THE NATIONAL LAW REVIEW (Jan. 8,
2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/traced-act-subjects-robocallers-to-increased-penalties-outlinesregulatory-and.
241
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 561.
242
Because the calls do not constitute commercial speech, one could not rely on the argument in Bolger,
that due to the greater risk for confusion or deception in advertising messages, the statute could be analyzed as
being content-based restrictions on commercial speech. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 61
(1983).
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the consent of the consumer, 243 which post-Duguid could include exemptions
for the federal government and authorized third parties under agency law. One
could argue that by including the exempted robocalls by reference, Section 8 of
the TRACED Act is content-based. Like the debt collection exemption, these
exemptions could continue to permit favoring certain forms of speech, such as
government communications, over other forms of speech. This provision of the
statute could be viewed as an implicit content-based regulation and should then
be reviewed under strict scrutiny.
Under a strict scrutiny analysis, a court could follow the same arguments set
forth in Duguid, that either the goal is not compelling or that the statute is not
narrowly tailored to achieve its goals. 244 If the exempted calls are placed for
emergency communications, then the government has a stronger case for a
compelling interest to overcome a strict scrutiny analysis. If the purpose of the
communication is for a government contractor to reach a citizen, the government
may have a more difficult time arguing that the statute is narrowly tailored to
achieve that goal or that there is no less intrusive means to reach that goal. An
example of a less intrusive means to achieve this communication without an
exemption would be to require a live person to place the call or to get consent
from the individual. The government could have also achieved its goal through
a content-neutral means by permitting auto-dialed calls for pre-existing
relationships with the federal government. If a reviewing court finds that Section
8 of the TRACED Act violates the First Amendment, then the statute has a
severability clause that states that the section may be held to be invalid and that
the remainder of the Act shall be unaffected. 245
In October 2019, Facebook Inc. asked the Supreme Court to review the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Duguid v. Facebook Inc. 246 The Ninth Circuit invalidated
the debt collection exception but left the rest of the TCPA intact. 247 On appeal,
the Court may have the opportunity to strike down the entire TCPA. The
Supreme Court would also have the opportunity to examine the additional TCPA
exemptions. Striking down the exemptions or the whole of the TCPA would

243
Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence (TRACED) Act,
Pub. L. No. 116-105, § 8, 113 Stat. 3274.
244
Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146, 1154–55 (9th Cir. 2019).
245
Pallone-Thune Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence (TRACED) Act,
Pub. L. No. 116-105, § 15, 113 Stat. 3274.
246
Alexis Kramer, Facebook Asks Supreme Court to Decide Robocall Law’s Validity (1), BLOOMBERG
LAW (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X8BJRGVC000000?bna_news_filter=techand-telecom-law&jcsearch.
247
Duguid, 926 F.3d at 1156–57.
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likely impact the future of the TRACED Act, which includes exemption
provisions and seeks to limit similar forms of speech.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Congress, the CFPB, and the FCC need to work together to
create clearer guidelines for regulating debt collection practices. The FCC’s call
blocking services based on reasonable analytics are overbroad and do not take
into account that the nature of debt collection calls inherently have some of the
key characteristics that the agency looks for in fraudulent calls. The CFPB in its
final agency rule should create good faith frameworks that permit debt collectors
to make contact with debtors, regardless of debtors’ wishes to cut off
communication, for litigation and appropriate debt collection purposes. The
CFPB should also seriously address the issue of limited content messages and
put in place meaningful and protective measures for consumers that are also fair
to debt collectors trying to make contact with debtors. The FDCPA should be
amended to include meaningful limits on the ability of a debtor to cut of nearly
all communication with the debt collector or the debt collector’s attorney. By
creating safeguards for appropriate communication, debt collectors will not risk
additional FDCPA liability for simply trying to contact the debtor on matters
related to litigation or settling the dispute. These safeguards would both protect
the debt collector’s interest in being able to recover their funds as well as the
debtor’s interests in not being pressured or treated unfairly by the debt collector
and their attorney.
First Amendment concerns relating to the FDCPA and the TRACED Act are
valid. Under a First Amendment analysis, the FDCPA would most likely fail a
content-based strict scrutiny standard of review by any court, because its means
are not narrowly tailored to its compelling interest. Under a commercial speech
analysis, the FDCPA could also fail a First Amendment analysis since the
regulation does not directly advance the state’s interest and does not achieve the
government’s goal by proportionate means. The TRACED Act, with the
exception of Section 8 recognizing the exemptions to consent requirements,
would most likely pass a First Amendment analysis under a content-neutral
intermediate scrutiny standard of review. Yet, the Supreme Court has not yet
reviewed the entirety of the TCPA. The Supreme Court’s ruling on the
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constitutionality of the entire TCPA could have a major impact on deciding
whether the TRACED Act could withstand a First Amendment analysis by a
reviewing court.
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